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Demographic change in Saudi Arabia may be one of the main determinants 
not only of political stability, but economic as well. In particular, the 
ability of the country to develop its human assets will, in the long run, 
determine the kingdom's ultimate success in diversifying its economy away 
from oil. 
The purpose of this paper is to survey recent demographic trends in 
the Kingdom, especially as they affect the development of the nation's 
human resources. Based on this assessment several future scenarios are 
outlined. 
MAJOR DEMOGRAPHIC PATI'ERNS 
Saudi Arabia has by far the largest percentage of nationals in its labor force. 
Demographic trends in the Kingdom indicate that more than 720,000 Saudi 
Arabians, representing almost 9 per cent of the population, will reach the 
age of 20 during the period 1988 to 1992 (Table 1). In the same period, 
the total number of Saudis in the labor force is projected to rise by just 
over 220,000. The shortfall is of course, due to the fact that only 120,000 
women or about 6 per cent of Saudi women aged 15-60 are projected to 
be working in 1992 (Table 2). 
As a result of these demographic trends and the country's anticipated 
manpower requirements as its productive structure becomes more sophis-
ticated, the foreign workforce will be increasingly crucial in filling certain 
specific occupations. The country now employs about 100,000 Europeans 
and North Americans in managerial and technical jobs.1 However, this 
source may be endangered by the social trends taking place in advanced 
economies. In the early 1990s the number of young people entering the 
West European labor market will fall by 25 per cent. The result will 
be a growing shortage of appropriately qualified people, particularly 
information technology specialists and service company managers. The 
net effect will be that Arabian companies will find it increasingly hard to 
hire European managerial and senior technical staff.2 
Analysts anticipate expatriate pay levels will increase in real terms 
over the next several years as western skilled labor supply shrinks. 
The trend will be compounded by the weakness of Gulf currencies on 
foreign exchange markets.3 
What is certain is that the private ~ctor will have to step up efforts to 
develop the pool of nationals capable of running large, modern enterprises 
as employees, rather than proprietors. 

























SAUDI ARABIA: NATIONAL POPULATION BY AGE, 1987 AND 1992 
1987 1992 
Number Percent · Number Percent 
1,386,300 20.1 1,673,400 20.5 
1,077,100 15.6 1,300,500 15.9 
868,200 12.6 1,027,600 12.6 
722,600 10.5 854,700 10.5 
614,300 8.9 721,100 8.8 
500,000 7.2 589,200 7.2 
391,600 5.7 456,300 5.6 
317,000 4.6 366,500 4.5 
251,200 3.6 288,600 3.5 
200,300 2.9 231,000 2.8 ,, 
158,300 2.3 182,500 2.2 
138,600 2.0 160,900 2.0 
115,000 1.7 136,400 1.7 
164,100 2,4 192,700 2.4 
6,905,000 100.0 8,181,400 100.0 
J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, Saudi Arabia into the 90s (University of Durham: 
Mountjoy Research Centre, 1988). 
TABLE2 
SAUDI ARABIA: NATIONAL.WORKFORCE, 1978-1992 
Males Females Total 




1,384,000 3.0 105,200 3.6 1,489,200 3.1 
1,424,500 2.9 108,700 3.4 1,533,200 3.0 
1,464,600 2.8 112,300 3.2 1,576,900 2.8 
1,505,400 2.8 115,900 3.3 1,621,300 2.8 
1,548,600 2.9 120,000 3.5 1,668,600 2.9 
Source: J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, Saudi Arabia into the 90s (University of Durham: 
Mountjoy Research Centre, 1988). 
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MANPOWER PROBLEMS 
Statistics on population and the labor force clearly reveal the degree of 
dependency on foreign labor. The number of economically active nationals 
is fewer than might be expected for several reasons: 
(1) The population is very youthful. 
(2) Widespread expansion of secondary and university education has 
taken place in the past decade. 
(3) The labor force participation has been reduced because only a 
small proportion of women are engaged in wage employment. 
The large importation of foreign workers has raised a number of issues 
related to the country's manpower strategy. 
(1) Unemployment of Productive Nationals. A major issue is whether 
such a level of immigration is actually causing unemployment 
amongst the national population. It is possible that the large 
numbers of cheaply and easily available expatriates are slowing 
down the transfer of nationals from the traditional to the modern 
sector. Furthermore, Saudis are becoming less inclined toward 
production and related occupations. This development implies a 
continued heavy dependence on foreigners to fill such jobs. 
(2) Underdevelopment of Human Resources. A more profound 
aspect of the importation of so much labor has been the 
stunted development of their indigenous human resources. The 
widespread use of migrant labor combined with the high level 
of wealth, has led to a proliferation of luxury employment for 
Saudis, which amounts to their withdrawal from the productive 
workforce. In fact, the educational system has become geared 
towards preparing nationals for this luxury employment rather 
than for productive employment. Thus migration has distorted 
the development of human capital in the Kingdom. Labor 
migration has led to native dependency on foreign manpower 
not only in quantitative, but also qualitative terms. 
The relatively open employment policy of the government, coupled 
with a civil service system that minimizes competition and ignores an 
objective system of evaluation, has in all likelihood produced this low 
level of job commitment and low productivity. Continued dependency on 
imported labor may intensify this trend. More government efforts towards 
the localization of the labor force have, in general, brought about a clear 
mismatch between the job requirements, and the nationals available to fill 
them. Such a trend has resulted in the low productivity of the Saudis who 
make up the labor force. 
LABOR MARKET DISTORTIONS 
The above patterns have arisen in large part from the presence of labor 
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market distortions in at least three areas:4 
(1) Rural/urban population distribution. 
(2) Distortions between the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors, 
and 
(3) Skill mismatches in the labor force. 
Rapid rural-urban migration has characterized most developing coun-
tries, particularly the Gulf states. However it appears to have occurred to 
a much larger scale in the Kingdom. While the higher urban percentage in 
it may be the result of geography, the higher growth in urban populations 
experienced over the last decade is more likely to be due to other factors. 
The negative effects on development of a too rapid rural-urban migration 
are well documented. It can lead to shortages of labor in the agricultural 
sector, large-scale urban unemployment/under-employment, urban bias in 
the government's economic policy, large external dis-economies in urban 
areas and so on. 
The government expenditure patterns explain much of the additional 
migration observed in the Kingdom. In fact the Kingdom has experienced 
rapid growth in government employment (predominantly in the urban 
areas). Apparently the heads of government bureaux seek to maximize 
the size of their ministries by maximizing budget allocations and hence 
employment. Oil revenues accruing to the government increase the ability 
of all bureaux to maximize their size. In addition, government employment 
is often used as an unemployment benefit substitute. Increased employment 
by the government would explain the faster migration either in terms of 
increasing the rural wage differential or by increasing the probability of 
urban unemployment. 
The second area of distortion is that too high a proportion of the labor 
force moves into sectors that do not face international competition. Damage 
to development arises as the move away from tradeables undermines the 
resource base to produce directly productive activities. The net result is a 
relatively high proportion of the labor force in services in the oil producing 
countries, and a relatively low proportion in manufacturing. 
Several factors probably contribute to this employment pattern: 
(1) Government programs to reduce unemployment through public 
sector hiring. 
(2) A cultural preference for white collar jobs which tend to be more 
common in non-tradeables. 
(3) Dutch Disease factors whereby the relative profitability of 
services improves vis-a-vis manufacturing. 
The final area of labor market distortion is that of skill mismatches. This 
is essentially the problem of too many PhDs and two few mechanics. The 
symptom of this would be relatively high levels of disguised unemployment 
among the highly educated coupled with a shortage of artisans. The damage 
arising from these skill mismatches lies in the way the various economic 
sectors are likely to expand while faced by labor constraints. 
Two elements of the change in government behavior may provide a 
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transmission mechanism for skill mismatches. 
(1) There has been very rapid decision-making involving education. 
This is part of the general problem of the pressure on govern-
ments to spend quickly. This has resulted in a very rapid 
expansion in the tertiary education sector (including sending 
students abroad) with only limited consideration for the impli-
cations of this on the primary and secondary sectors, together 
with a neglect of technical education. In effect, education policy 
has developed as a by-product of spending decisions rather than 
as the result of any carefully laid out education policy. 
(2) Once the mismatches have begun to appear the government has 
been willing (via its revenue access) to absorb these mismatches 
by its employment policies - over development of bureaucracy 
to provide employment for nationals returning from education 
abroad who would otherwise be employed below their desired 
status. The willingness to absorb the skill mismatches thus 
tends to disguise the appearance of signals warning against the 
development of even greater mismatches. 
HUMAN RECOURCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
As noted above, in order to deal with its labor problems, the Saudi 
Government is attempting to develop and implement a human resource 
development strategy. This involves not only upgrading the skills of the 
local workforce, but also entail the opening up of positions for women 
in the labor force. 
While it is true that the large number of expatriate construction workers 
brought in to implement the physical development of the Kingdom may 
no longer be needed, workers skilled in more sophisticated technology 
will be required to accomplish the Kingdom's new objectives. Moreover, 
even within the construction industry there are indications that suburban 
development, manufacturing construction, hospital construction and other 
projects to complete the country's economic base will continue to give 
rise to a large number of construction projects. Agricultural development 
plans also suggest new construction needs as does the new emphasis on the 
development of solar energy and the Kingdom's vast mineral resources. 
Setting construction needs aside, however, the ten principal manpower 
implications of the current development strategy are:s 
(1) Diversification of the Kingdom's revenue resources through the 
development of industry, mining, agriculture and solar energy 
potentials will be giving rise to new demands for technically 
skilled manpower. Many of these skills lie in areas in which 
Saudi nationals have yet to be trained. 
(2) Saudization priorities by economic sector will have to be 
determined and then implemehted if emphasis is to be placed on 
the employment of Saudis 'in important permanently productive 
sectors including those slated for predominance in the govern-
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ment's investment and expenditure decisions', for example 
water, natural resources, petrochemical, and refined petroleum 
products. 
(3) Operation and maintenance of the Kingdom's vast infrastruc-
ture will require a large force of Saudi nationals trained in 
maintenance, machine operation and other vocational skills, 
as well as those capable of operating capital-intensive, peak-
technology modes of production. 
( 4) The private sector will be asked to play a major role in the 
education and training of Saudi nationals as part of this 
increased responsibility for the overall development of the 
Saudi economy. This will further decentralize the Kingdom's 
training efforts. 
(5) The proposed 'dual standard' immigration criterion for Moslem 
expatriates versus non-Moslem expatriates will give rise to 
serious questions of ethnic control of specified job skills and 
or labor pools. 
(6) Political instability in the Gulf region, together with the defense 
obligations incurred by the Kingdom as a member of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, will result in increased pressure 
to Saudize the Kingdom's military forces. The introduction 
of compulsory military service will assist in this objective, but 
it will also drain the total labor pool and create new training 
needs. 
(7) The new emphasis on human services and cultural enhancement 
programs will necessitate the development of Saudi manpower 
to manage programs for the handicapped: to deliver health 
service and health education to urban and rural patients, and 
to staff libraries and other cultural centers being proposed. 
(8) A renewed emphasis on teacher education also will be required 
when elementary education is made compulsory, anti-illiteracy 
and adult programs are expanded, military education intro-
duced at the secondary level and computer science is introduced 
into secondary and vocational training institutions for both girls 
and boys. 
(9) The limitation of university positions to capable students and to 
those enrolled in fields of study relevant to the Kingdom's needs 
will necessitate a realignment of university resources, including 
teaching staff. Redundancy of humanities faculty may permit a 
reduction of expatriate staff as well as foster new career options 
for others. 
(10) A reassessment of 'appropriate' jobs for Saudi women will need 
to be followed by specific government directives to assure the 
enactment of measures designed to facilitate entry of women 
into new sectors of the labor force, 
It is unrealistic to believe that all ten areas can be 'Saudized' within the 
next decade. Saudization priorities will most likely be established and for 
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the immediate future all other manpower needs temporarily relegated to 
expatriate personnel. When compulsory primary education has gained a 
toehold and when military training has augmented the skills of Saudi males, 
Saudization efforts will be possible in a wider variety of fields. 
For the present however Saudization will most likely focus on those 
segments of the labor force that only Saudis can serve best- national security 
and the preservation and enrichment of the Kingdom's cultural traditions. 
Specifically these would include the Saudization of all natural resource 
development, Saudization of the military, Saudization of all ministries 
(enhanced by the use of Saudi women as support staff) and the Saudization 
of certain human services and cultural enhancement programs. The latter 
might also be administered in large part by Saudi women and by 'redundant' 
Saudi academics currently teaching in university facilities unrelated to 
priority national development needs. 
PROBLEMS IN SAUDI HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
In recent years Saudi educational programs have run into a number of 
difficulties:6 
(1) Education even at the primary level has not been compulsory, 
leaving many of the government's educational goals devoid of 
the means of enforcement. 
(2) Rural and agriculturally oriented families do not have a tradition 
which places high value on education beyond the study of religion 
and perhaps some basic literacy skills. They are unable to 
perceive the long-term economic value of pursuing an education. 
(3) Students are dropping out of elementary and secondary edu-
cation as soon as their literacy or basic skills are adequate to 
permit them immediate employment. Once out of school and 
without benefit of reinforced learning, even those rudimentary 
skills are often lost. 
(4) Mobility, particularly from rural to urban areas, is fostering 
the student drop-out rate and encouraging young men to seek 
employment in factories, in the military, and in various vocational 
fields. 
(5) There is an abundance of means by which young people can make 
money without high levels of education. The economic incentive 
to remain in school is therefore greatly weakened. 
(6) Wealthy parents may destroy a student's motivation to pursue 
education by giving a youth all the economic privileges that 
regularly accrue to those who have worked to attain them. 
The net result has been a significant economic loss as well as a human 
resource loss for the Kingdom as a whole and for the individual. Were 
one to assess the situation from a purely economic viewpoint, it could 
be suggested that the government mighf concede all clerical, craft, trade 
and similar skills to expatriates, encouraging the Saudis either to remain in 
agricultural pursuits, or to pursue professional skills. 
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The main problem is that the large working middle class that stands as a 
backbone of most developed societies have yet to emerge in Saudi Arabia, 
and it is not likely to develop until education is made compulsory at both 
the elementary and secondary levels and truancy laws are enforced. 
Current statistics indicate that male Saudis now require an average of 
11.34 years to complete 6 years of primary education and female students 
require an average of 8.67 years to complete their primary education. 
Until all sectors of society, public and private, progress beyond the 
current practices of putting an immediate need for Saudis in the labor 
market ahead of the long-term educational development of the population, 
the problem is likely to persist. While the opening of new schools and the 
enrollment of new students is important, retention of these students in those 
schools is of equal importance to the overall development of Saudi Arabia's 
middle level manpower needs. 
To overcome the problems involving public education, a number of 
companies in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States have developed 
elaborate programs for technical education. The most notable and lavish is 
the Aramco training program, designed to produce Saudi technicians. This 
program has been used as a model for similar programs in the region. The 
big push to localize the technical workforce came around 1980 stemming 
from the enormous expansion of Aramco's operations after the oil price 
rises. At that time the annual training budget totalled $636 million. It is 
now down to around $150 million a year and 5,000 trainees, selected on 
leaving school, have been through the program. 
Aramco admits to the limitations of its program. Although all operators 
are now Saudi, most technicians are still expatriates and their jobs are filled 
by Saudis only as part of a natural fall-out. Despite careful screening there 
is at least a 20 per cent drop-out rate. Inevitably, there is competition from 
other industries, especially Jubail, in searching for the right candidates. 
Instilling a sense of discipline remains the hardest part of the program. 
Training of locals is part of most industrial joint venture schemes in the 
Gulf, either in-house or outside, often at overseas institutions. 
PROBLEMS FACED BY SAUDI WOMEN 
One cannot discuss the economic development of Saudi Arabia and the 
Kingdom's manpower needs without discussing the subject, however 
controversial, of the role of Saudi women. 
Today, Saudi women comprise one-third of the Kingdom's present 
university enrollments. The cost effectiveness of education for women 
can be severely challenged if the end product is never to find its way into 
the marketplace. At present there are a number of constraints against the 
employment of Saudi Women.7 
(1) Most job opportunities for them are restricted to fields per-
ceived to be in keeping with the.traditional role of women as 
wives and mothers. 
(2) Freedom of movement is restricted by the ban on women driving 
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and their need for male drivers to accompany them for business 
purposes. Public transportation for women does not exist. 
(3) The paucity of child-care centers restricts the activities of those 
women who cannot afford live-in servants. 
(4) Business initiatives are hampered by the inability of women to 
register a business in their own name, or obtain home loans or 
government land grants which might provide the wherewithal to 
establish a private business. 
(5) A woman is prohibited from working if such work is contrary to 
the wishes of the male members of her family, upon whom she 
is dependent both socially and economically. 
( 6) The religious interpretations of some sectors of the society deem 
it inappropriate for women to work outside the home. 
(7) Fear of the social stigma which may be attached to the working 
woman and/or her family, when suggestions are made relative to 
the family's economic status or the woman's morality is a further 
constraint on women working. 
(8) The lack of incentives created by the relatively comfortable 
circumstances of much of the Kingdom's citizenry reduces 
the incentive for women to work. The same applies to the 
Islamic tradition which stipulates that the men of the family 
are responsible for the family's income. 
(9) The inability of most working Saudi women to penetrate the 
decision-making process in the workforce has stifled women's 
opportunities. 
(10) Decades of Saudi tradition which 'conditions' Saudi women to 
accept rather than challenge their role in life has been a subtle, 
but powerful, deterrent to the advancement of women's role in 
society. 
Another important constraint which is extremely important in any 
developing nation striving for the enhancement of its human resources 
is the lack of women's networks, professional organizations or other 
such associations which could serve as catalysts for concerted action on 
the restrictions inhibiting women from entering the workforce and at the 
same time providing career counseling, management training, and other 
professional development opportunities for young Saudi women. 
In most Arab countries work that is considered 'respectable' includes 
teaching, secretarial work and medicine. Even in Saudi Arabia, where 
attitudes toward women are the most conservative in the Arab World, 
efforts are made to create acceptable surroundings to facilitate their 
working. 
The main conservative objection then is not to women's work but to their 
involvement in the public sphere. The fact that Gulf women's participation 
in the workforce is low shows that 'need' at the popular level is an important 
condition to be met before women are fully integrated into the modern 
sector. 
Conservative attitudes are a factor, but not a primary one as some Gulf 
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analysts are aware. It has been pointed outS that the number of Saudi 
women in the workforce does not reflect their numerical weight in the 
country. This cannot be ascribed to the fact that most women went into 
fields like education, medicine, and social welfare, since the government 
still had to depend on many foreign women for these skills. The reasons 
for the low numbers are more related to the fact that most women did not 
face an economic need to work. 
It is interesting in this respect that in the 'poorest' Gulf states in per 
capita terms, Bahrain and Oman, there is a more positive attitude towards 
women's work, both at the government and popular levels. In Oman in 
particular the government is active in sponsoring seminaries and strives to 
encourage women's integration into the work force. In these countries the 
people need to earn more than one income per family, and the state cannot 
afford to finance the vast manpower imports of their neighbors. 
In general it appears that cultural attitudes are not the major obstacle to 
women's integration into the labor force. Other factors are also important. 
These include: (a) the country's manpower situation, (b) the need for 
income at the family and individual level, (c) the encouragement provided 
by the state, and ( d) the skills that job-seekers possess. If the conditions of 
need, opportunity and ability are met at the state and the popular levels, 
then women will be fully integrated into the workforce. 
FUTURE TRENDS 
Two future scenarios concerning migration to the Gulf can be suggested at 
this stage:9 
(1) Further declines in oil prices may result in a new surge of 
foreign worker departures together with a slump in new work 
permit issues and the retention of only the most essential 
expatriate workers. However, local entrepreneurs, merchants 
and businessmen, whose interests are served by the expatriate 
communities' demands for consumer goods and housing, would 
resist the policy changes implied by this scenario. 
(2) The patterns of migration will follow recent trends - the gradual 
decline in the number of expatriate workers is likely to continue, 
and may even stabilize, with a relatively low level of net labor 
outflows and a high rate of foreign labor retention. This will 
be accompanied by heightened foreign labor mobility within 
individual Gulf states. Immigrant communities themselves will 
supply an increasing proportion of new non-national labor 
market entrants as their demographic profiles mature, thus 
further reducing the level of new labor inflows. 
Effectively, the Kingdom would repeat the experience of 
Western Europe where immigrant labor also proved excep-
tionally resilient. This was particvlarly the case after the first 
oil price shocks of 1973-74. Despite the recession and the 
closure of labor markets to the new foreign labor inflows, 
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the number of Turkish gastarbieter in the Federal Republic of 
Germany increased from 590,000 (1974) to 623,900 (1980). 
Regardless of which scenario holds, the government is likely to continue 
to favor arabization of the labor force. This is likely to be within the context 
of an overall reduction of the foreign population. This will be difficult to 
achieve, requiring considerable determination. 
The private sector wishes to continue the option of mobilizing large 
numbers of cheap workers, usually of Asian origin. This approach tends to 
favor the arrival of non-national dependents, to bolster local consumption 
and trade. Increasing numbers of Saudi children will tend to stimulate short-
term demand for foreign workers. Also, natural increase of the non-national 
communities will grow in importance. 
The most likely scenario is one in whichlO Arabization will progress, 
especially of the public sector and professions, with the consequent 
tendency for dependent Arab populations to increase. Settlement of 
foreigners will be encouraged by the easing property market and landlords' 
desire for tenants. The process of arabization will occur in a labor market 
that contracts slightly for a few years, with some net re-exports of non-
nationals, but which is then likely to grow again in the early 1990s, with a 
stable or increasing number of non-national workers. 
Both the non-national and national populations will grow under these 
circumstances. While there is likely to be a significant increase in Saudi 
women in the labor force, there is unlikely to be a significant contraction of 
the foreign population. For a while, the shares of national and non-national 
populations are likely to remain constant. However, within the foreign 
population the share of Arabs will increase. 
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